The Cyprus Problem, 1974-2008

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Co vedlo obě strany k vyostření situace na Kypru před rokem 1974
Události, které vyústily v incident z roku 1974
Napětí mezi nově rozdělenými řeckými a tureckými Kyperčany
Události, které zhoršily řecko-turecké vztahy na Kypru
Určete odpovědnost za kyperský spor
Možné řešení kyperského konfliktu

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ABSTRAKT

V roce 1974 zahájily Turecké jednotky invazi na Kypr. Obsadily a dodnes drží severní část ostrova, kde byla následně založena nová republika. Tato práce analyzuje Kyperský problém z obou úhlů pohledu a dokumentuje napětí, vzniklé mezi nově rozdělenými Řeckými a Tureckými Kyperčany v období po roce 1974, které vedlo ke zhoršování vztahů mezi oběma stranami. V neposlední řadě také dokumentuje snahy OSN a jejich představitelů sjednat mír. Na závěr pak shrnuje zapojení obou znesvářených stran a významnější účast Řeckých Kyperčanů ve vyhrocení konfliktu.

Klíčová slova: Sjednocení   Rozdělení   Řecký Kyperčan   Turecký Kyperčan

ABSTRACT

In 1974, Turkish forces invaded Cyprus, capturing and occupying the northern part of the island and ultimately establishing a new republic. This thesis analyzes the Cyprus problem, exploring both sides of the issue. It documents the ensuing tension between newly separated Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the period following 1974, leading to deteriorating relations between the two sides. It also documents U.N. attempts to broker a reconciliation. Ultimately, this thesis argues that Greek Cypriots' involvement in escalating the issue is on higher degree than contribution of Turkish Cypriots.

Keywords: Enosis   Taksim   Greek-Cypriot   Turkish-Cypriot

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INTRODUCTION

The Cyprus problem appears to be one of the most complex disputes in modern history. Its roots can be traced to the early twentieth century, as Cyprus slowly transformed from colony to independentiation. Ulterior motives of Greek Cypriots (*enosis*) and later Turkish Cypriots (*taksim*) increased tension on the island. Culminating with the Greek Cypriot attempt to assassinate President Makarios III, triggering Turkish military intervention in 1974. This thesis focuses on the period following 1974 and events affecting inter-Cypriot relations, including various attempts to resolve the current situation. The ongoing struggle and a communication breakdown led Turkish Cypriots to unilaterally declare independence and form the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, covering over 34% of the island. Any attempt by Cypriots or UN representatives to revive discussions met with resistance and ultimately with failure. A lack of knowledge about the opposition created a general atmosphere of misunderstanding and mistrust, undermining chances for an agreeable settlement. Suspicion, heightened by nationalism, undermined bargaining efforts.

Examining the reasons and conditions behind the Cyprus problem provides understanding of the attitudes of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It is these attitudes, buttressed by nationalism and to some extent extremism that helped to make each community rigid on their stances. And it is this mutual rigidity that has made compromise impossible.

1   HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Cyprus is a strategically located Mediterranean island between the Middle-East, Africa and Europe. As such, Cyprus has in the past attracted the attention of the likes of Alexander the Great, Richard the Lion Hearted and David Lloyd George, the latter pushing for the annexation of Cyprus as a British colony in 1925.

1.1   Island of too much Interest

The annexation of Cyprus by the British, however, did not derail Greece's plans for Cyprus, as Greeks together with Greek Cypriots (hereafter referred to as GC) were not ready to give up the idea of *enosis* (reunification with Greece). Likewise, Turkey along with Turkish Cypriots (hereafter referred to as TC) came up with the idea of *taksim* (a division of Cyprus into two independent Greek and Turkish areas), to reassure adequate Turkish presence on the island. Not long after Cyprus became a British colony, Greek Cypriot and later Turkish Cypriot extremist groups appeared. GCs established the Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) or the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, while TCs in the opposition established the Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT) or the Turkish Resistance Organization. Thus, seeds of the conflict were planted on the island. [1]

1.2   Multicultural struggle

Dissatisfaction continued to grow on both the Greek and Turkish sides. GCs were more and more pro-*enosis*, expecting the British Empire to join the cause and help the island join Greece. But Britain was not forthcoming, and the GCs' patience slowly vanished, with the first riots commencing in 1931. TCs immediately answered through their leader, Fazil Küçük, by publicly demanding *taksim*. Yet, the issue stagnated until 1936, the revival year of Greece's interest over the island after a change in leadership. Great Britain, on the other hand, refused to hold discussions about Cyprus. The status quo was maintained, but desire for control of the island increased on both Greek and Turkish sides. [2]

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[1] Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled* (New York: The Overlook Press, 1997), 115.

[2] John A. Komoulides, Review of *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus*, by Ioannis D. Stefanidis (New York: New York University Press), 1999.

As far as World War II is concerned, except for a few German blitzkriegs, Cyprus's exposure was limited. And, Cypriots were strong Allied supporters despite their doubts over British rule. In 1940, the attack of Fascist Italy against Greece provoked about 6,000 Cypriots to enlist and fight side by side with the British. By the end of the war, over 30,000 Cypriots had fought under British command. On the other hand, *enosis* was not forgotten. In fact, Cypriots hoped to make several new friends in high positions (especially in London), expecting a reward for their support of the Allied effort, but none of that happened. The British demonstrated gratitude by allowing Cypriots exiled in 1931 to return, by repealing religious laws and by giving Cypriots previously convicted of sedition a reprieve in 1946. The British decision to ignore *enosis* irritated many Cypriots. Their disappointment led them to re-focus their efforts on internal-Cypriot politics with an emphasis on re-unification with Greece.[3]

In October 1950, Makarios III became the youngest Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Cyprus and succeeded Makarios II as the political leader of the island. General George Grivas, a Greek military leader and the leader of EOKA, visited Makarios 1951, but left frustrated over Makarios' doubts about the potential of a successful guerilla movement. In 1954, Greece asked the United Nations to consider a Cypriot reunification with Greece at the next General Assembly, however the proposal was rejected. TCs surprisingly did not take any action to oppose the proposal, as British rule denied them from UN involvement. Nevertheless, violence continued and the future remained unclear. Something needed to be done to ease the tension, but no actions were taken. Thus, the ongoing strain between the two communities led to extremism.[4]

Grivas and the EOKA guerrilla movement in Cyprus which substantially harassed British forces between 1955 and 1959, and in the process worsened Greek-Turkish relations.[5] Meanwhile in 1958, Greece and Turkey opened discussion between each other, moderated by the British. For the first time an independent Cyprus was formally considered and surprisingly adopted as compromise instead of *enosis* or *taksim*. Amendments to the

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[3]Eric Solsten, *Cyprus: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO, 1991). http://countrystudies.us/cyprus/10.htm (Accessed March 4, 2011).
[4]Ibid.
[5]J. S. Koliopoulos and M. Verenis Thanos, *Greece: The Modern Sequel* (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2007), 328.

constitution were made and the Treaty of Alliance was signed, limiting the number of Turkish and Greek soldiers in Cyprus. Through the Treaty of Establishment, Britain was authorized to keep two sovereign military bases on the island – Akrotiri with Dhekelia. And the Treaty of Guarantee authorized all participants – Britain, Greece and Turkey – to guarantee the security, independence and integrity of Cyprus even by force.[6]

In August 1960, the newly formed Republic of Cyprus became a member of the United Nations. Even so, these events did not guarantee a peaceful future.[7] To understand the conflict forming within the island, it requires acknowledgement of the prevailing attitudes towards the Republic of Cyprus. Very few endorsed its status as a unified republic: Greek Cypriots required *enosis*, unifying Cyprus with Greece, whereas Turkish Cypriots supported *taksim* to hold Cyprus partitioned equally between Greece and Turkey, or staying as a British colony, which would guarantee TC's security. The constitution of the Republic delegated power and political positions depending on ethnicity, making it inadequate and unacceptable for both Greek and Turkish communities, resulting in inter-communal violence in 1963.[8]

The foundation of an independent Republic of Cyprus did not help to curtail violence. With Archbishop Makarios III as president and Fazil Küçük as vice-president, both sides were not able to find common ground and often vetoed each other's proposals, with riots and street fights ensuing each time. Riots kept occuring repeatedly, causing increased public tension. Further violence led the United Nations to form an international peacekeeping force of about 7000 troops, to serve for 3 months. Athough the initial results of the United Nation Peacekeeping Force In Cyprus (hereafter referred to as UNFICYP) were excessively good (law and order were restored swiftly), the force has only separated parties of the conflict and did not offer any long-term solution, which was crucial for lasting peace in Cyprus.[9]

Separation of both GCs and TCs did suppress violence, but did not improve future prospects. While the problem remained, inter-communal talks were held, trying to provide

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[6]Eric Solsten, *Cyprus: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO, 1991). http://countrystudies.us/cyprus/10.htm (Accessed March 4,2011).

[7]Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 121.

[8]Deborah J Gerner, "untitled", http://www.jstor.org/stable/164688 (Accessed August 12, 2010), 3.

[9]James M. Boyd, "Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping", http://www.jstor.org/stable/2705787 (accessed August 12, 2010).

a solution suitable for each side. Talks took place for extended periods of time, however they proved fruitless. And as talks failed to produce a positive outcome, more people triedd to solve the dispute through violence.[10]

1.2.1 Inter-communal violence before 1974

No matter how hard Makarios III and Küçük tried to stabilize the situation in the streets, the results were questionable. "Makarios was a political conservative practicing balance of power diplomacy to avoid the partition of Cyprus."[11] As Makarios' vision of Cyprus did not include Greek or Turkish participation, each group began showing its strength publicly, and violence escalated on both sides. Such a policy indirectly helped the EOKA extremist group, led by George Grivas, to be more active. The response of the rival TMT was swift, and a new round of mutual violence was initiated. Consequently, nobody was able to stop the violence, and it continued unabated for several years. In following years, National Guard, led also by Grivas, assaulted several Turkish Cypriot villages, sparking Turkey to invade Cyprus. Only NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and American pressures halted Turkish military intervention to commence. Necessary requirement was removing disproportionate Greek forces from the island (including Grivas as a leader). Partially losing its leader who had been deported, EOKA remained semi-active yet Grivas kept giving orders remotely so the *enosis* campaign continued even without his presence. Grivas stayed in Greece until 1971, and then returned to Cyprus secretly. Moreover, the situation in following years worsened, and the threat of Turkish intervention was closer than ever before.[12]

Makarios III was elected as a pro-*enosis* president, but over time his mind changed and his policy became more independency-based. General population favored such change hence his chances in upcoming elections raised rapidly. Makarios's re-election incensed EOKA and there was something more to come soon.[13]

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[10]James M. Boyd, "Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping", http://www.jstor.org/stable/2705787 (accessed August 12, 2010).
[11]Koliopoulos and Thanos, *Greece: The Modern Sequel,* 325.
[12]Ibid., 329.
[13]Ibid.

1.2.2 Formation of extremist groups

Without a doubt, extremists played a significant role in shaping the future of Cyprus. Growing tension on the island led to reciprocal violence. Originally, EOKA founded in 1955, was little more than a group of enraged men, wanting revenge rather than justice, who believed it was time to take active roles and fight against anti-*enosis* TCs and collaborating GCs. As EOKA activity spread, membership increased and the group evolved into a better organized semi-military squad. While their actions increased in intensity and daring, more and more civilians understood that the latest events were not random but happening on purpose, with organizational backing. In 1957, TCs organized their own resistance to show EOKA that their actions would not go unanswered. Unfortunately, the groups did little to solve the problems between communities. They only ignited circles of violence, bringing collateral damage and worsening already quite poor Greek-Turkish relations.[14]

Yet, the main role of the extremist EOKA in creating the Cyprus problem was still to come. President Makarios seemed to be untouched by the extremist policies spread using fear and violence. General Grivas, the leader of EOKA, took every chance that appeared to support reunion with Greece, even by eliminating some of the opposition. Nevertheless, his efforts yielded few resuslts. Therefore he intensified his efforts to achieve his goals. Such efforts intensified the threat of intervention by a third party.[15]

For Grivas, Archbishop Makarios appeared to be the only obstacle between Cyprus and reunion with Greece, so it was only a matter of time before any attempt to eliminate him occurred, one way or the other. With the support of a Greek military junta (through Greek military leader Dimitrios Ioannides), General Grivas was given the task of Makarios's removal. In fact, "Ioannides claimed that Greece is capable of removing Makarios and his key supporters from power in 24 hours, with little if any blood being shed and without EOKA assistance." The Turks, he said, "would quietly acquiesce [in] the removal of Makarios, a key enemy." Plan's execution date assessed to 15 July 1974.[16]

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[14]Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 119.
[15]Koliopoulos and Thanos, *Greece:The Modern Sequel*, 328.
[16]Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 115.

1.3   Failed Assassination

Deemed President Makarios was not only meant to be taken off his post, but to be eliminated once and for all, so as not to pose a future threat.

The tactical plan was clear, surrounding all four roads coming to the presidential palace in Nicosia, leaving zero chance for Archbishop Makarios to escape. No matter how precise and synchronized the plan was, it did not count with one thing: Nicosia, with its Heavy traffic and narrow streets was never meant to be used by military convoys, especially heavy armored vehicles. Thus, three of the driveways were blocked on time, but the fourth was not. The last attack squad got stuck in traffic and arrived a little later, leaving a path out of the palace open. The Archbishop with a few of his closest bodyguards escaped, heading to the Troodos Mountains for safety. After arriving in the Troodos, Makarios immediately requested evacuation from the island. The British answered quickly, sending one of their airplanes to pick up Makarios and his guards at Paphos airport. Even though there were shots fired at the plane upon take off, the plane made it to the United Kingdom unharmed, and a new episode of Cypriot history began.[17]

After the evacuation of Makarios, General Grivas did not waste time. Within several hours, a new government was established with Nikos Sampson, a strong *enosis* supporter and EOKA member, as the new president.[18]

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[17]Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1999), 172.
[18]Ibid., 14.

2   MILITARY INTERVENTION

"An attempt by the Greek Junta to assassinate Makarios triggered Turkey's invasion in 1974" confirms Koliopoulos and Thanos[19], but a full scale invasion (in this case performed in two waves, establishing a beachhead for the final attack afterwards)[20] requires weeks of preparations, including the movement of arms, soldiers, vehicles and other.

Such a large movement of equipment and soldiers cannot go unnoticed, especially by nations with strongly developed intelligence. According to Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, who had access to archives declassified by the US in 1980s, the CIA (American Central Intelligence Agency) did notice these preparations through their middle-eastern agent network, yet decided not to take any action. Although Henry Kissinger, head of the US National Security Council from 1973-1977, has never confirmed receiving the information, clearly all major intelligence plan would have passed over his desk.[21]

Nicole and Hugh Pope reveal the importance of historical events and its contribution in shaping the dispute. "Cyprus was a terrible accident waiting to happen, a time bomb of unfinished business between Turk and Greek" and "when it blew up in 1974, [it] ripped the Mediterranean island apart."[22]

2.1   United Nations and NATO involvement

Since both Cyprus and Turkey were members of the United Nations, the U.N. faced an unprecedented problem of one UN member invading another.[23] Moreover, other countries involved (Greece, Turkey, the USA or the United Kingdom) joined NATO decades prior, so the discord could possibly go beyond the UN borders, becoming a joint dispute of NATO and the UN.[24] Regarding all future possibilities, Ankara necessarily needed to retain

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[19] Koliopoulos and Thanos, *Greece: The Modern Sequel*, 329.

[20] Spurgeon Thompson, Stavros Karayanni And Myria Vassiliadou, *Cyprus After History* (London: Routledge ltd., 2004).

[21] Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy*, 162.

[22] Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 118.

[23] United Nations, "Member States", United Nations Member States, http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml (Accessed February 19, 2011).

[24] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Member countries", NATO Member Countries, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-87E49022-0359CD24/natolive/nato_countries.htm (Accessed February 19, 2011).

the UN as well as NATO, without taking any actions against them while performing the invasion. Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig argue that "Turkey would not be foolish enough to do it without telling the United States. What would happen if the United States intervened and sent in the Sixth Fleet?"[25] After landing in Northern Cyprus, several nations such as the United Kingdom or Greece were only one step from taking military actions towards Turkey. Greece started with a massive build up of armed forces along its border with Turkey, while the UK moved its closest ships into the immediate vicinity of Cyprus with additional reinforcements to follow. Some of the British units were standing in sight of Turkish troops' and they were aiming at each other, waiting for what would happen. The British expected the Americans to backup UK forces in their actions, however the Americans were not willing to strike against Turkey, and did not support British forces. James Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary in 1974, spoke of his role in the dramatic events: "It was the most frightening moment of my career … We nearly went to war with Turkey. But the Americans stopped us."[26]

2.2 Impacts of the coup

Between the first Turkish offensive on 20 July 1974 and the second offensive on 14 August 1974, much changed on the island of Cyprus. Over 34% of the island was taken (from the northern part of Nicosia to the north/east coasts), and the Greek side lost much of its economic strength (approx. 48% of agricultural production, 70% of natural resources, 41% of stock-breeding units, 56% of plantations and 20% of forested areas). The Greeks also lost Famagusta port, which was responsible for 83% of island's international trade.[27]

Hand-in-hand with economy, the northern part of Cyprus lost most of its original inhabitants. During the intervention period, almost 200 000 GCs (at that time, total Cypriot population was around 750 000) forfeited homes, being forced to leave the northern part. Whereas the GCs began leaving the North, TCs immediately moved from Southern Cyprus as they expected the North to be better place for them to live, free from any ethnic issues.

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[25]Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy*, 161.
[26]Ibid., VII.
[27]Harry Anastasiou, *The Broken Olive Branch*, 123.

Approximately 65 000 TCs moved from the South.[28] The total casualties included, approx. 3 000 dead with over 1,600 people missing. Some survivors got stuck in the occupied area for a short period. Hundreds of GCs were imprisoned by Turkish troops and vice-versa, most of whom were exchanged later. Destiny of others, remains unknown.[29]

Way too many inhabitants of the northern part were expelled, so it could not possibly stay functional as before and Ankara knew it would have to do something to populate the north. Soon after determining the new borders, Turkey began sending settlers so the northern region could survive. About 80 000 Turks made the move from the mainland, gaining automatically Cypriot citizenship. With new residents came different attitudes and opinions. Harry Anastasiou noticed the arrival of a new mentality and pointed out a change in the position of fresh TCs: "More Turkish Cypriots live off the island than on it; in their place have come mainland settlers with no interest in a solution."[30] Afterwards, the TCs leadership transitioned under Rauf Denktash, who helped to establish the TMT resistance group in 1950s.[31]

2.2.1 Violations of Human Rights

Turkish military intervention initiated a number of human rights violation reports, most of which concerned Greek Cypriots being forced to abandon their homes in the North. Turkey was charged with numerous violations (i.e. looting, murder, robbing, rape, torture, denial of civilians to return to their homes, ...) committed by its troops during the coup on Cyprus. However the European Council declined the request to investigate reported violations, most likely for political reasons. By that time, Turkey was a NATO member with the Treaty of Guarantee providing it with the right to intervene if necessary. During the following years, ongoing violations were reported, accusing Turkish soldiers of coercion, intimidation and abuse in order to remove GCs from the North. Very few Greek Cypriots decided to stay in the north and even fewer were allowed to do so, Those who could remain saw their rights momentously limited. Property ownership, freedom of movement, medical care and education were restricted if allowed at all, yet almost none of the cases have been

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[28]David Souter, "The Cyprus Conundrum: The Challenge of the Intercommunal Talks", http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992742 (Accessed August 12, 2010), 84.
[29]Harry Anastasiou, *The Broken Olive Branch*, 123.
[30]Ibid., 122.
[31]Ibid.

investigated. To some extent, restrictions applied to Turkish Cypriots in the north as well, being harassed by Turkish troops or mainland settlers. Overall, there existed in the north a lack of basic human rights.[32]

2.3 Recovery from the separation

Nicos Sampson's presidency established after the coup lasted short, not long after the escape of legitimate President Makarios, Samson's government was removed and a period of uncertainty continued. Archbishop Makarios returned to his post in December, however a few months later a Turkish Federated State was established with Rauf Denktash as its first president. Although the invasion stopped at the Attila Line (named of the Operation Attila; the UN refers to it as "the Green Line") Turkish military presence continued. The north is controlled by level of almost 30 000 soldiers, securing newly seized area.[33]

In 1974, with Turkish support, the UN General Assembly called unanimously for "The speedy withdrawal of all armed forces', 'the cessation of all foreign interference in (Cyprus') affairs' and the return of refugees to their homes throughout the island." The following period was one of inter-communal silence. Only a few negotiations took place an the top-level, held by Makarios and Denktash in 1977. President Makarios died in August 1977, succeeded by Spyros Kyprianou, who continued the talks in 1979. Most of the negotiations moderated by the UN, between the 1977 and 1981, showed no progress towards any settlement. Nearly all of them failed over the division of governmental powers, freedom of movement or property ownership.[34]

2.3.1 Double-tiered problem, the downfall of negotiations

Each side of the dispute recognized core differences. Additionally, the conflict itself should be divided into two different areas: One concerning inter-Cypriot attitudes and the other concerning relations and influences to the mainlands (Greece and Turkey). Consequently,

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[32]Adamantia Pollis, "Cyprus: Nationalism vs. Human Rights", http://www.jstor.org/stable/761796 (Accessed August 12, 2010), 94-96.
    [33]David Souter, "The Cyprus Conundrum: The Challenge of the Intercommunal Talks", http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992742 (Accessed August 12, 2010), 86.
    [34]Ibid., 80.

the solution to the conflict grows in complexity as additional aspects are considered. Contribution of nationalism also creates more obstacles in the way of resolution.[35]

The inter-communal level considers only the personal interests of GCs and TCs. Since the mid-1950s, GCs tried to stabilize the situation by offering TCs a share of the power, representation and influence, allowing TCs in civil services, police, government, side-by-side with GCs. But TCs did not want to share, their idea seemed to be more independence-based. Later, during the 1970s, the policy of sharing turned into a competition over who has more influence and power. Instead of walking side-by-side, both groups tried to avoid becoming the minority. A lack of contact between the communities left misleading ideas of the opposing group, indirectly supporting policies inside of the community, focusing more on the mainlands, i.e. GCs believed that the North is completely under military control, not knowing about the political life running there smoothly, and TCs trusted Denktash that *enosis* was still the main motive of all GCs, even though there was very little support for it in the South. Such misunderstandings led to suspicious atmosphere of mistrust, undermining the positive outcome of inter-communal talks before they even took place.[36]

2.4   Embargoes imposed on Northern Cyprus and Turkey

Shortly after the formation of the Turkish Federated State (hereafter referred to as TFS), an embargo was placed on the North. The government of President Kyprianou, recognized as legitimate for the Republic of Cyprus, had a right to impose an economic embargo, and the decision-making process did not take long. Leaving Northern Cyprus in a poor economic condition, tightened its relations with Turkey, which offered its help. Turkey had to pay roughly two-thirds of TFS' budget, but it was just enough to survive and left no money for development. The embargo caused the stagnation of the North and standards of living in the North and the South diverged. Moreover, few could expect significant economic change in near the future since other nations had quite similar intentions.[37] Commencing in

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[35]David Souter, "The Cyprus Conundrum: The Challenge of the Intercommunal Talks", http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992742 (Accessed August 12, 2010),,77.
[36]Ibid., 77.
[37]Ibid., 87.

February 1975, the Americans placed an embargo on Turkey on arms and military aid. The International Monetary fund and other institutions followed Washington's lead.[38]

2.5 Establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

The Turkish Federated State's first intentions were to settle down and stabilize the situation after the military intervention. TCs expected the TFS to be only a temporary solution. The TCs did not think of possible agreement the same as before because now they had a place of live quite similar to their previous desires of independence from GCs, feeling safe (concerning ethnic issues) without sharing anything. Few felt the need to rush into negotiations anymore. With no meaningful progress being made, the TCs' focus slowly shifted towards their needs and long-term solution acceptable for the majority of TFS inhabitants. As a result, the TC legislative assembly formed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (hereafter referred to as TRNC) in 1983. Rauf Denktash, the first president, felt secure about the step ahead. Since 1983, however only Turkey has officially recognized the TRNC as the legitimate authority over the Northern Cyprus.[39] According to the Popes, "Mainland Turkey, in fact, is not as comfortable with the status quo as Denktash. It has paid dearly for its loyalty to its ethnic kin, far beyond the $200 million a year subsidy it must pay to keep the breakaway state afloat."[40] Consequently, Cyprus has caused Turkey serious financial difficulties over the years. "There's no oil, no foreign currency, no goods, no medicine, no raw materials, no fertilizers and no production ... we can't even close the 351 billion lira deficit by printing money. Even if we had paper, ink and a printer it would not be possible. It would be another way of saying that the state has sunk." said Turkish Prime minister Suleyman Demirel at government meeting on 24 January 1980.[41]

UN Secretary-General Perez De Cuellar, forced further inter-communal talks in 1983, but no progress was recorded. A year later, UN representatives held personal meetings with heads of both sides, negotiating key issues for next joint summit. With Cuellar controlling the agenda, the UN organized a meeting in 1985 on neutral ground, with Presidents

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[38]Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled,* 128.
[39]Adamantia Pollis, "Cyprus: Nationalism vs. Human Rights", http://www.jstor.org/stable/761796 (Accessed August 12, 2010), 5.
[40]Nicole and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 123.
[41]Ibid., 129.

Kyprianou and Denktash coming to New York. Instead of discussions over key issues however, both sides mired down in the wording of preliminary drafted documents. A series of negotiations followed, attempting to find a compromise. As usual, a compromise suitable for one side resulted in an unacceptable amendment by the other. Similar scenarios played out until elections in 1988, when George Vassiliou, successor of Kyprianou, asked Cuellar immediately to revive the negotiations, without preconditions. Even though new talks did not bring much progress, Vassiliou brought new incentive and willingness to continue negotiations regularly, on which Denktash agreed.[42] According to Harry Anastasiou, "The rise of George Vassiliou to the presidency of the Republic of Cyprus in 1988 infused a spirit and approach to the Cyprus problem considerably different from the one that had dominated its traditional politics. President Vassiliou was the first GC leader to exhibit genuine commitment to a federal solution deviating from the familiar nationalism."[43]

The UN sponsored a series of negotiation from 1988 to 1990, focusing on resolution attainment through federal government. Such a government would respect bi-communality as well as bi-zonal territory regarding its own constitution. Considering the enthusiasm and optimism Vassiliou brought to the table, the results of the new negotiations were disappointing. Both parties stressed different issues more, GCs demanded freedom of movement, settlement and ownership whereas TCs stressed bi-zonality and independent authorities of the two provinces within a federal state. Before actual settling, TCs tended to hold the status quo as it was.[44]

Upcoming events appeared to be laying additional obstacles to an already complex situation. The Republic of Cyprus officially began accession talks with the EU, leaving a negative impression on TCs as the EU refused Turkey's candidacy. "Simultaneous deterioration of Euro-Turkish relations following the rejection of Turkey's candidacy for the EU, added to strains over the Cyprus problem, with Greco-Turkish relations suffering a significant setback."[45]

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[42]David Souter, "The Cyprus Conundrum: The Challenge of the Intercommunal Talks", http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992742 (Accessed August 12, 2010), 81.

[43]Harry Anastasiou, *The Broken Olive Branch,* 103.

[44]Eric Solsten, *Cyprus: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO, 1991) http://countrystudies.us/cyprus/10.htm (Accessed March 4,2011).

[45]Harry Anastasiou, *The Broken Olive Branch*, 106.

Late 1980s were defined by one step forward, one step back. Following the application of Cyprus to the EU, Rauf Dentash angrily cancelled all talks with the UN. Greece on the other hand reappraised its relationship with Turkey and publicly supported peace movements for the first time in many decades. However, an agreement seemed to be still a mirage.[46]

2.5.1 Talks resume an idst a new wave of UN involvement

In 1991, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali renewed talks. The Turkish president, Turgut Özal, proposed to lead discussions in the previously tried style, with the mainlands present. Four parties were expected to participate: Turkey, Greece, GCs and TCs. Boutros-Ghali believed that the presence of both mainlands (Greece and Turkey) would increase the ability to consult proposals right away, therefore easing the negotiation. Nevertheless, before the talks took place, both Athens and the GCs refused Özal's proposal, counter-proposing five members to participate so as to make the the dispute more international (the UN Security Council was supposed to be the fifth part). Ankara quickly declined this counter proposal, as TCs generally believed that international involvement favored GCs' position. A year later in 1992, Boutros-Ghali held negotiations in New York, trying to smooth differences between the sides and at the same time lobbying for the UN proposal known as the "Set of Ideas" (a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation, forbidden to be partitioned or unified anyhow). Vassiliou accepted the proposal to be a basis for negotiation, while Denktash refused. Later, in a report to the UN Security Council, Boutros-Ghali accused Denktash of being intransigent, re-opening already agreed issues and not considering several ideas to be even a basis for a discussion. Boutros-Ghali also recommended steps to increase confidence and trust between the communities. In February the following year, President Vasiliou was succeeded by Glavkos Clerides, bringing more new blood to the negotiations.[47]

Commencing in New York on 24 May 1993, Boutros-Ghali proposed an economically favorable draft in order to connect both communities, introducing a new tax-free zone in

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[46] Harry Anastasiou, "Communication across Conflict Lines: The Case of Ethnical Divided Cyprus", http://www.jstor.org/stable/1555344 (Accessed August 12, 2010), 591.

[47] Suha Bolukbasi, "The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement Between 1954 and 1996", http://www.jstor.org/stable/164268 (Accessed August 12, 2010), 427.

Famagusta and re-opening the Nicosia airport for common use. He also hoped to partially solve the refugee problem through the re-opening of Varosha (a suburb of Famagusta) for about 10 000 GC refugees. First reactions of Denktash and Cleridies were doubtful but not negative. Discussions held on the topic continued until May 1994, with multiple practical difficulties appearing over time. Later that year, confidence-building measures were condemned. The issues hardest to resolve questioned availability of the airport to Turkish Cypriot airlines (Clerides labeled such a move as equal to recognition of TRNC), TRNC passport acceptability at the airport and law appliance in the Varosha area. Soon, the UN representatives found themselves deadlocked, abandoning all ideas. After Clerides' inauguration responsibility for the failure of talks did not rest only on the shoulders of Dentash. Clerides' stiff negotiating style and attitude towards several demanding topics contributed equally to the result. During the period from mid-1994 to 1997, few negotiations took place as both parties found themselves unprepared for compromise.[48]

Formal discussion of Cyprus's annexation by the EU began in 1998. At the same time Rauf Denktash asked for a new round of meetings, considering a confederation of two states. Ankara supported the request of confederation as it distinguishes sovereign countries, whereas GCs preferred a federation and disapprove confederate state for its partition and veto-rights. Once again, neither side proved readiness for a concession. [49]

Clerides received a request from Denktash for series of meetings in 2001, and Clerides accepted the appeal. The initiative probably originated in the increasing pressure associated with Cyprus's possible membership in the EU. Talks started in 2002, moderated by the UN. Both groups seemed interested in a breakthrough before Cyprus would sign Treaty of Accession to the EU. [50]

Meanwhile, only a fortnight after Turkey's elections, the United Nations revealed complex peace plan for Cyprus. It was soon called by the name of UN Secretary-General

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[48]Suha Bolukbasi, "The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement Between 1954 and 1996", http://www.jstor.org/stable/164268 (Accessed August 12, 2010), 427.

[49]Tozun Bahcheli, "Searching for a Cyprus Settlement: Considering Options for Creating a Federation, a Confederation, or Two Independent States", http://www.jstor.org/stable/3331129 (Accessed August 12, 2010).

[50]Meltem Muftuler-Bac and Aylin Guney, "The European Union and the Cyprus Problem 1961-2003" (Mar. 2005), 289-290.

who introduced it. The Annan Plan appeared as realistic solution to discuss.[51] New and controversial proposal at the time initiated passionate discussions throughout the island. The Annan Plan, however was not perfect and until early 2003 could not find necessary support among leaders of each community. Therefore Annan decided to edit the plan according to amendments proposed by both sides. During the negotiating period in April 2003, Turkish Cypriots surprisingly opened the Green Line for the first time since 1974 and people could freely move from both sides. Such a showing of good will preceded referendum, promising positive results.[52] However the plan's fifth and final version was rejected in a public referendum in 2004. Although the majority of TC voters said 'yes' to the Plan, a majority of GCs rejected it. Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, expected both presidents, Denktash and Tassos Papadopoulos, to lobby for the Annan Plan before the referendum itself took place. However the opposite happened, as both Denktash and Papadopoulos urgued their constituents to reject the Plan. Subsequently, the rejected referendum led to no attempt to revive inter-communal talks.[53] (for more details about the Annan plan, see chapter 4.2)

2.5.2 Latest developments

A year later, in 2005, TCs elected opposition leader Mehmet Ali Talat to be only the second president in history of the TRNC. Simultaneously, Kofi Annan requested Papadopoulos to submit a list of amendments to the Plan, but this request was denied. Rather than introducing a new round of negotiations, Papadopoulos used Cyprus's newly awarded EU membership to put pressure on Turkey. Yet, this too accomplished nothing.[54]

In 2006, Papadopoulos and Talat to agreed to resume negotiations and established committees in order to deal with daily issues and to help resolve the problem, as the current situation appeared to be a stalemate. Discussions over the shape and agendas of committees were held throughout 2007, but yielded few results, partially because the TCs still focused on aspects of the Annan Plan. GCs, for whom the Plan was a closed and rejected topic,

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[51]Varnava Andrekos and Hubert Faustman, *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2009), 20.

[52]Meltem Muftuler-Bac and Aylin Guney, "The European Union and the Cyprus Problem 1961-2003" (Mar. 2005).

[53] Andrekos and Faustman, *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, 20.

[54]Rebecca Bryant, "A Dangerous Trend in Cyprus", http://www.jstor.org/stable/30042446 (Accessed August 12, 2010), 31.

demanded talks based on relevant UN resolutions. Hence a deadlock remained until a presidential election on the Greek Cypriot side in February 2008.[55]

Dimitris Christofias's election could be denoted a call for a fresh attitude, and not the repetitive 'no', voiced by Papadopoulos since the declined referendum. Shortly after his inauguration, on 21 March, Christofias met with Talat face-to-face. For the first time, two pro-solution presidents negotiated directly without any third party mediating the talks, and soon announced a promising plan of future intensive and regular talks. Not even two weeks after their first meeting, Ledra street, the main shopping area in the heart of Nicosia, divided into two parts since the very beginning in 1964, and a symbol of division was reopened, becoming a single street once again. Seven days later Talat walked over the Greek side of Ledra, an event that surprised many and induced positive atmosphere as never before.[56]

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[55]Hubert Faustmann and Erol Kaymak, "Cyprus" *European Journal of Political Research 47* (2008), 940.
[56]Hubert Faustmann, "History in the Making? A New Drive for a Solution to the Cyprus Problem" *Mediterranean Politics Vol. 13, No. 3* (Nov. 2008), 456.

3   NATIONALISM

The nationalist mind looks at the Cyprus problem in a different way. No matter whether Greek or Turk, both groups view the problem as an indisputable truth, based on historical facts which cannot be changed by any discussion nor by different point of view, and displays the conflict as inevitable. Such an attitude revealed itself in both Greek and Turkish communities, with clash as resulting repeatedly with the same consequences over the decades. Yet nationalism also killed potential initiatives by eliminating reasons to seek peace and settlement. Heavy circumstances undermined efforts of all interest groups (including not just GCs and TCs, but also Greece, Turkey and the United Nations) trying to resolve the Cyprus problem. Over extended periods of time, little to no progress was made and as long as nationalist attitudes persist, it is unlikely a solution will be found on a diplomatic level. Even if an agreement can be reached, the danger of tension and violence will remain until ethno-nationalist tendencies vanish. Ethnic nationalism renders bi-communal coexistence unreachable and indefensible as both sides cannot stand participation of other minority.[57]

Nationalism contributed to the Cyprus problem more than any other aspect. First, nationalist tendencies appeared long before the actual beginning of the dispute in 1974, strengthened by differences in ethnicity of Cypriot inhabitants. Harry Anastasiou claims it is impossible to understand the full scope and complexity of the Cyprus problem without the necessary insight into the nationalist mind. Only when viewed through a nationalist lense does the dispute start to make sense, not just as political discord but as reflections of Cypriot culture, society and mentality, as well as how the ideas of *enosis* and *taksim* fit into the nationalist framework of islands' hellenization or partition. Effects of increased nationalism are noticeable in most events happening in the twentieth century, from *enosis* calls to the UK in 1930s, the formation of EOKA in 1955, through the failed assassination in 1974 to refused referendum in 2004.[58]

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[57]Harry Anastasiou, *The Broken Olive Branch*, 11.
[58]Ibid.

3.1   Atmosphere of misunderstanding

The period following 1974 strictly separated both groups, creating an atmosphere of non-communication, mistrust and misunderstanding. Misunderstandings applied not just to the general public but also to high-positioned government officials, including politicians or negotiators. Moreover, such preconditions undermined even the slight remains of mutual respect, initiating mutual suspicion under any proposal. Lack of information, daily contact and insights towards the opposite party led GCs and TCs to begin stereotyping each other, not considering possible changes happening over time. On the other hand, these facts cannot be applied to the whole population. Especially in mixed villages (where GCs and TCs lived side-by-side for extended time periods) people do not have such negative attitudes and remember days of cohabitation in mutual respect. These contradicting ideas show the possibility of kindness and respect from each side, however unwilling they might be.   Yet, these moderate views are in the a minority, and are relative to personal experience.[59]

3.1.1 Curse of stereotypes

Stereotypes caused substantial damage to Greek-Turkish relations. Not by directly worsening them, but indirectly by creating prejudice and scorn. For instance, GC nationalism produced an image of Turks as ruthless heathens, killing Greeks on sight, raping women, showing no mercy for any GC. Whereas TC nationalism portrays GCs as butchers, killing even innocent children of TCs just because they stand in the way. Although these stereotypes demonstrate lack of information about the opposing party, an incapacity of kindness and zero will to cooperate combined together, create deadly atmosphere of intolerance. Yet these views cannot be applied as general rule over the whole population, more as common view of one community on the other.[60]

3.1.2 Legacy of pain

Both groups undeniably suffered throughout the conflict, TCs mainly during 1970s whereas GCs mostly after 1974. Fear, insecurity and suffering shaped the form of ethnic nationalism on either side, originating a legacy of extended pain, necessarily requiring

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[59]Harry Anastasiou, *The Broken Olive Branch*, 129.
[60]Ibid.

remorse and regret from the opposite community. While no answer seemed to be forthcoming, each group was angrily overwhelmed by ignorance, defiance and arrogance towards the pain they suffered. Victims in each community accepted stereotypes of nationalism as a last resort, seeking any way to avoid pain of the past. Active nationalists abused patriotism to dispose of responsibility, since most of them directly contributed by additional violence and bringing the situation to the boil. Consequently, nationalists to some extent abused even own victims. Instead of helping and leaving them to deal with the pain, nationalist paradox places them at the center of attention, emphasizing their loss and heroic behavior of joining the nationalist cause, placing them as nationalist symbol. Such placement re-opened victims' memories, putting them to the point of no escape. As a result, pain and its legacy affected communication across the Green Line, leaving one of the key issues in the whole Cyprus conflict unsolved.[61]

3.1.3 Non-communication process

Displaying national symbols expressed nationalist ideas and slowly began creating genuine process of non-communication. For GCs, a flag of Greece always flew right next to the Republic of Cyprus flag. Likewise with TCs, who never forgot to hang the flag of Turkey together with the TRNC flag. TCs perceived the flag of Greece to be symbol of violence, supremacy, repression and siege. While GCs saw the Turkish flag as a symbol of intervention and occupation. National symbols are still displayed and perceived in same manners even nowadays. Although their meanings have changed, it still sends negative messages to the opposite community. i.e. the massive Turkish flag painted on the foot of mount Pentaktilos is viewed as a glaring violation of justice. On the other hand, the flag of Greece on city hall in Nicosia shows TCs that the idea of *enosis* has not been abandoned (even though support for *enosis* is very little in the South).[62]

3.1.4 One thing, two views

From 1974 onwards, the TRNC was perceived in two opposing ways. GCs hold the Republic of Cyprus to be the only legitimate state with the right to control the island, and the TRNC is seen as illegal entity, created by secessionists using military power.

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[61]Harry Anastasiou, *The Broken Olive Branch*, 133-134.
[62]Ibid., 161.

TCs on the other hand look up to the TRNC as a state created after a necessary peace operation, and hence legal and legitimate authority over the North. Dozens of talks sampled re-opening the topic, but none of them succeeded. The only outcome was the eminent breakdown of negotiations. Harry Anastasiou sees the involvement of nationalism in this case, as nationalists view past events as historical truth which cannot be changed by any negotiations, a fact undermining chances of future settlement before the talks even take place, creating a genuine process of non-communication.[63]

In addition, TCs feel their state to be the only home they have had since 1960s, fitting well into their mono-ethnic vision of *taksim*. TCs apprehended GCs' request to reunify the island (with refugees going back to original homes) as an attempt of *enosis* to leave TCs helpless without shelter once again. On the other hand, GCs view calling for recognition of the TRNC to be a stunning violation of human rights and justice. Both arguments together leave no space for bargaining.[64]

The nationalist framework keeps natural the discussion process between the two communities on hold. Instead of shaping the area of interest continuously, to be acceptable by both participants of the dialogue, nationalism leaves no open space for negotiating and concession, changing the dialogue into a list of demands. Greek and Turkish nationalisms cannot withstand one another not because they are too different, but because they hold almost identical principles. Each nationalism holds the value of 'nation' as supreme and for one ethnic group, not accepting any other ethnicity to be part. At this point, nationalism could be radical and violent while defending its own freedom and principles.[65]

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[63]Harry Anastasiou, "Communication across Conflict Lines: The Case of Ethnical Divided Cyprus", http://www.jstor.org/stable/1555344 (Accessed August 12, 2010), 583.
[64]Ibid.
[65]Ibid., 582.

4   POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Recently, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots agreed on refugees' right to return, although after so much time since the intervention, it is unclear how to inact the return. Several important questions arose over the decades, increasing the complexity of the refugee issue. Varnava Andrekos and Hubert Faustmann question the applicability of the right to return of particular refugees: "It is the actual persons pushed out of their homes only? Or do descendants qualify? And how many generations of descendants should qualify?" These questions are difficult, and they are not the only issues to be solved. It is also unclear how many refugees would be involved and willing to return, considering so many years have passed since 1974. Most of the refugees built up new homes, settled into new conditions of different, southern livelihoods. Their original homes were already populated by newcomers, some of whom properly bought the houses for themselves or descendants never involved in the 1974 intervention. Additional time delay complicates the current situation even more, yet it is only a matter of time when the complexity reaches its peak and it will no longer be possible to effectively solve the refugee question. Some could say, the time had already passed.[66]

Soldiers seized the land in approximately two days, whereas the solution for the impasse could not be found for more than 35 years. Over the decades, the Cyprus problem appears to be a more complex conflict than anyone could ever expect. Any resolution will have to consider all aspects from historical legacy, ethnicity, nationalism with its paradoxes, fear, misunderstanding, concession and willingness. Omitting any aspect would endanger the resolution, leading to another failure.[67]

4.1   Responsibility

The intricacy of the problem renders determining responsibility extremely hard as far as all contributing factors are concerned. Assessing right or wrong is not as difficult as determining responsibility. For instance, what is worse? The strike of an extremist group or the exaggerated response of the opposite side? Some would say the first event is worse as it

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[66]Andrekos and Faustman, *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, 259-260.
[67]Nicole and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, 120.

induced the second, however not everyone agrees. Setting the border of what is still acceptable and what is not is mostly based on individual attitudes and feelings. Hence, building an objective pattern for assigning overall responsibility is nearly impossible. Yet, dividing the problem into time periods offers a chance to evaluate individual parts objectively, reaching an overall view afterwards. The logical division would be pre-1974, post-1974 and recent events (from 2004 onwards).

The period before 1974 demonstrates improper initiatives mostly from the GC side. Endless *enosis* calls requiring union with Greece, changing into violent riots when unnoticed. EOKA group was established more than 2 years before the opposing TMT, which also traces who began escalating the conflict. Substantial EOKA harassment of independent Republic of Cyprus culminating in failed assassination in year 1974. GCs contributed to the conflict a more than TCs during the period before 1974.

The post-1974 stage is defined by the execution of the intervention and the recovery from it, ensuing with stagnation of the mediation. At first, negotiating positions of both sides appeared equal. However establishment of the TRNC brought TCs what they always wanted, a separate and independent state, to some extent decreasing the TCs' willingness for settlement. Denktash more likely kept adding additional obstacles. In the end, the Treaty of Guarantee provided Turkey with the right to intervene if TCs' presence appears to be threatened, and a violent takeover would have substantial impact on Turkish Cypriots. However, the size and the method of the intervention remains questionable, hence the TCs are the ones carrying the greater responsibility for the situation following 1974.

The denied referendum in 2004 delayed the solution of the dispute indefinitely. Even though TCs expressed the desire for solution, GCs viewed The Annan Plan as too radical and pro-Turkish and therefore voted against. Once again, a plan with a decent chance for success has been declined and blamed for favoring one community. After such an extended period of time since the intervention, any plan for a solution necessarily need to be radical; otherwise the solution may not be final. In this case, Greek Cypriots clearly and surprisingly preferred no solution even after such an extended period of time.

4.1.1 Difference in the meaning of being a 'refugee'

Each community defined the word 'refugee' in their own terms, often resulting in misunderstandings on a negotiating level. TCs referred mainly to the period from the 1960s until 1974, living in uncertainty and insecurity, leaving home for safety and prosperity.

Some of the TCs were refugees up to three times during the period. Repeated refuge helped the TCs speak of the experience unemotionally during negotiations. On the other hand, GCs' exodus happened once but massively, caused by the intervention in 1974. One and massive refuge of GCs forced them to leave the life of prosperity and safety, heading for a place of uncertainty and insecurity. The first experience left strong feelings in the hearts of GCs, who passionately negotiated the refugee problem. Necessarily, these differences had an effect on the success of the inter-communal talks.[68]

4.2   The Annan Plan

The Annan Plan in its fifth and final draft was delivered to the population as a threat instead of a chance for reunion and new start after the years. For multiple reasons, Greek Cypriot officials refused to accept the plan and in the same way, it was passed on to ordinary GCs.[69] Preconditions on the island undermined the plan's chances to succeed significantly. However it has managed to create a more realistic view of a possible solution, although controversial and difficult to implement. The Annan Plan proposed two separated states under a joint federal government, containing a questionable power-sharing system, most likely being able to provide both communities with security and sustainability, preventing either group from oppression. TCs would control approximately 28% of the island's territory after the application of The Annan Plan, whereas GCs would govern a little under 72%. Also, a small number of refugees from both sides would be allowed to return home.[70]

The plan effectively avoided building a solution on constitution and government before 1974. Future agreement on the basis of unsolved events from the period before 1974 would risk occurrence of violence. Yet The Annan Plan was not flawless. According to Andrekos and Faustmann, the economic part of the plan was one of its least developed aspects. For instance, the plan expected each government to be held responsible for compensating its own people, reimbursing the damages caused by the occupying power. Forcing the victim country to pay the indemnity would create a dangerous precedent of victims undertaking responsibility for actions committed by anyone else. [71]

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[68]Harry Anastasiou, *The Broken Olive Branch*, 259-260.
[69] Andrekos and Faustman, *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, 218.
[70]Ibid., 254.
[71] Andrekos and Faustman, *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, 155.

Rebecca Bryant discovered that re-opened borders had negative effect on the referendum declined by GCs. The status quo recorded almost zero change since 1974 and after nearly thirty years of stagnation, the first checkpoints opened, followed by a revival of forgotten memories. Many GCs crossed the border, visiting former villages and noticing new people living in their houses. These revelations resurrected bitter feelings of the past, leaving GCs with the impression of officials trying to legalize the whole intervention. A year after opening of the checkpoints, the referendum took place although the people did not have enough time to absorb all the changes and refreshed memories. GCs still felt betrayed and needed more time to get over these feelings. Although there is no way of knowing how long it would be, any additional time would have given The Annan Plan higher chances for success. With so little time for people to adopt, any solution would have facef the threat of eminent rejection.[72]

4.2.1 Meanings of Greek Cypriot 'no' in the 2004 referendum

Greek Cypriot reasoning behind the negative vote in 2004 displayed the way of public thinking about the dispute. The majority seen an opportunity and a better position in negotiations from being an EU member, rather pressuring Turkey than seeking new solution by themselves. The vote also demonstrated the GCs' fear of unknown, losing GC identity and heritage. It is clear how old ideas from the past thirty years still shaped the look towards TCs, ignoring them as political figures. According to Bryant, "What their rejection has wrought in the island is a new period of inter-communal mistrust, along with rising nationalism in the majority-Greek south."[73]

4.2.2 Meanings of Turkish Cypriot 'yes' in the 2004 referendum

The Turkish Cypriot vote revealed a general desire to move forward. Strong arguments for the approval included a bi-zonal federation, guaranteed recognition and territory for the TC community. The positive vote also portrayed readiness to move ahead independently, without Turkey providing backup for TCs as for the past thirty years. Economic aspects of future cooperation between the sides also played an important role. As the North was less

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[72]Rebecca Bryant, "A Dangerous Trend in Cyprus", http://www.jstor.org/stable/30042446 (Accessed August 12, 2010), 35.
[73]Ibid., 30-31.

prospering than the South, reunion would necessarily result in ending embargoes and a rapid increase of inter-communal trade (and international at the same time), helping the North to regain healthy economic status.[74]

4.3   Realistic resolution

GC accession to the EU complicated the current situation even more. Turkey's membership has been denied in past because of the Cyprus problem although, the Republic of Cyprus's accession went smoothly. Officially, the issues of Cyprus and Turkey's EU applications are not linked, but an indirect involvement necessarily appears. Hence it is in Turkey's best interest to solve the dispute, however Turkey cannot seal the deal alone. The twentieth century demonstrated the jeopardy of a single independent state on the island of Cyprus. Therefore, a solution requires clear distinction of the two communities, providing them with necessary guarantees to assure presence of both communities in a bi-zonal federate state. Certitude of guaranteed conditions will help both Greek and Turkish Cypriots suppress fear. As a result, mutual respect and trust can be rebuilt slowly. Although the overall solution for the Cyprus dispute requires at least at partially radical attitude in the area of Greco-Turkish relations, progress need to be taken in small steps to secure developments, avoiding the threat of possible breakdown. Dismantling the atmosphere of mistrust may take decades, yet it counts as one of the most important ingredients for lasting peace in Cyprus.

Although The Annan Plan has been denied, it did offer solid basics over power delegation, incentives and government carving. Using several areas of the Plan as inspiration (or even borrowing them) for future solution proposals might give the proposal higher chances for a success. The extended period after 1974 managed to stuck the dispute on obstacles generated by Cypriots themselves. From powerful pressures for *enosis* at first, and later by demanding partition. Nowadays these pressures slowly vanish, however its legacy remains in minds of Cypriots even nowadays, leaving very few options for ongoing handling. The nationalism-based rivalry emphasized by an unwillingness for concession were also considerable aspects to be dealt with. The current situation will probably not improve in near the future, however it is necessary not to give up hope and stop looking for a bipartisan solution, in favor of GCs as well as TCs.

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[74]Rebecca Bryant, "A Dangerous Trend in Cyprus", http://www.jstor.org/stable/30042446 (Accessed August 12, 2010), 30-31.

CONCLUSION

The main aim of this thesis was to examine the Cyprus Problem from all angles, revealing historical pre-conditions as well as the individual involvement of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, with special attention to major motives behind their actions. Fundamental differences between the two communities prevented them from peaceful co-existence, but ethnic differences, the participation of third parties (Greece and Turkey), nationalism, and the legacy of unfinished business all hurt the chance at compromise.

The current situation on Cyprus is the result of long-term negotiation stagnation and reflects disability to reach an agreement from either side. Early periods were marked by ambitious Greek Cypriot efforts for *enosis*, whereas Turkish Cypriots responded through the public demand of protective *taksim*. Dangerously increasing tension between both communities resulted in the Greek Cypriot attempt to assassinate Cypriot president Makarios III. Such an action increased suspicion in the eyes of Turks and Turkish Cypriots, looking at Greek Cypriots as an eminent threat for every Turkish Cypriot. This suspicion led to the Turkish military intervention in 1974. Military intervention had been considered since 1967, when only American and NATO pressures on Turkey kept the coup from happening seven years sooner. Apparently, EOKA and Greek extremists did not view the situation as a warning of what may happen in the future, and strengthened *enosis* efforts instead of slowing down. During the period after 1974, Turkish Cypriots did not feel any pressures for a quick solution of the dispute. Hence the situation remained unchanged until 2004, when the United Nations presented The Annan Plan as a potential solution. Public referendum in 2004 showed a spirit of compromise among Turkish Cypriots, yet Greek Cypriots denied the proposal, thereby delaying the resolution once again.

Findings suggest that the Greek Cypriots deserve more blame, but Turkish Cypriots also unquestionably contributed to the current situation on Cyprus. It is now on both communities to overcome old customs, because nothing less than a genuine attempt from both Greeks and Turks will bring lasting peace on the island. It is in the best interest of not just Cypriots, but also of Turkey and Greece, to put aside differences and finally conclude an unfortunate chapter of Cypriot history.

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